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Abstract 
Risk communication, where scientists inform policy-makers 
or the populace of the probability and magnitude of possible 
disasters, is essential to disaster management – enabling 
people to make better decisions regarding preventative steps, 
evacuations, etc. Psychological research, however, has 
identified multiple biases that can affect people’s 
interpretation of probabilities and thus risk. For example, 
availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) is known to 
confound probability estimates while the description-
experience gap (D-E Gap) (Hertwig & Erev, 2009) shows low 
probability events being over-weighted when described and 
under-weighted when learnt from laboratory tasks. This paper 
examines how probability descriptions interact with real 
world experience of events. Responses from 294 participants 
across 8 conditions showed that people’s responses, given the 
same described probabilities and consequences, were altered 
by their familiarity with the disaster (bushfire vs earthquake) 
and its salience to them personally. The implications of this 
for risk communication are discussed. 
Keywords: description-experience gap; risk communication; 
decision making; availability; bias. 
Introduction 
People make decisions based on their perception of risks.  
They also demand that others (e.g., policy makers) propose 
methods to mitigate risks.  Such proposals are often costly 
to implement and there may be financial or other costs 
should a risky event occur.  It is, therefore, important that 
risk perception matches reality.  Psychological research, 
however, indicates that people are subject to a range of 
biases that lead to mis-perception of probabilities leading to 
inconsistent trade-offs and sub-optimal decisions (see, e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & 
Phillips, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). 
The L’Aquila verdict, which saw 6 scientists convicted of 
manslaughter for failing to adequately communicate 
earthquake risk prior to the event, shocked the scientific 
community and prompted urgent re-appraisal of methods 
used to convey information about low-probability, high-
impact events. Prior to the trial, an international commission 
convened to investigate the earthquake’s predictability - and 
the communication of its risk - recommended that risk 
assessments be formalised through authoritative operational 
earthquake forecasting (OEF). It also suggested that social 
scientists develop methods for communicating risk to the 
public and decisions makers (Jordan et al., 2011). 
Research on seismic aspects of OEF is progressing with 
new models being developed and tested (see, e.g., 
Marzocchi, Lombardi, & Casarotti, 2014; Steacy et al., 
2014). However, progress on communication remains a 
major topic of discussion (Jordan et al., 2014).  
Biases in Risk Perception 
Given the above, it seems valuable to review psychology’s 
findings about how people interpret risk (i.e., the probability 
of an undesirable outcome). A variety of known effects 
seem relevant to how a person, faced with information being 
provided by an expert, might interpret that information and 
thus react. Some central examples are discussed below. 
 
Prospect Theory and the Description-Experience Gap 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) describes 
how the majority of people respond when facing risky 
choices in simple gambles such as: ‘Take $100 now’ or 
‘Win $250 if this coin toss comes up heads and nothing 
otherwise’. In such instances, people are risk averse when 
dealing with gains and risk seeking for losses. They also act 
as if low probabilities are higher than they actually are and 
as if high probabilities are lower. 
Many of these observations, however, are shown to 
reverse in situations where, instead of being told the 
probabilities, people have to learn them from an 
environment – the so-called Description-Experience Gap 
(hereafter, D-E Gap; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).  
Risk communication, of course, involves both described 
probabilities (from the scientists or government) and the 
probability for risky events that each member of the 
‘audience’ has learnt from their environment. 
 
Availability 
Availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) describes the 
tendency of people to weight the likelihood of events 
according to how available such events are to memory. This 
makes sense in that, when operating in a natural 
environment, the number of instances of an event recalled 
should depend on how many such events have been seen. 
It can leads to biased estimates of probability, however, 
where an event’s availability differs from its actual rate of 
occurrence. For instance, media coverage focusses on 
‘interesting’ – and often rare – events; the result being that 
people overestimate the likelihood of events (e.g., terrorist 
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attacks) that receive coverage while underestimating 
probabilities for events that are less often reported upon.  
Key aspects of availability are the familiarity and salience 
of events – that is, how well known they are to the person 
and how memorable (for a discussion of this, see Sunstein, 
2005). For example, most people are aware of (i.e., familiar 
with) the risks of house fires but these are more salient to 
someone who has seen such a fire than to people who have 
simply heard about them. Both familiarity and salience 
affect the availability of people’s memories of particular 
events and thus their estimates of their probabilities. 
Given this, it seems likely that people’s recalled 
probabilities will differ markedly from the actual 
probabilities of occurrence for the disasters. 
 
Format Changes 
Another effect known to alter interpretation of probabilities 
is changes to presentation formats. For example, there is 
evidence that people prefer natural frequencies (e.g., ‘1 in 
100’) to percentages (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer 
& Hoffrage, 1995) and even those who dispute this (Sloman 
et al., 2003) agree that the way probabilities are presented 
can enhance or impede people’s understanding of them. 
 
Relative vs Absolute Change 
Finally, it is possible that people are more sensitive to 
relative than absolute change, leading to the expectation that 
people’s reaction to a disaster risk may (depending on the 
presentation of the information) be influenced by the degree 
to which the probability has changed as well as by the final 
probability itself (Stone, Yates, & Parker, 1994). 
Aims and Objectives 
Given the above, the central aim of this paper is to 
determine what effects play a role in predicting behaviour 
when the described probability of a disaster needs to be 
integrated into a person’s pre-existing knowledge – learnt 
from their experiences with such disasters in the real world. 
A key question, then, is whether people’s behaviour will 
be better predicted by Prospect Theory or the D-E Gap? 
Prospect Theory predicts that low probability events will be 
overweighted while the D-E Gap predicts the opposite.  
Availability, meanwhile, suggests that people’s learnt 
probabilities will be biased by their familiarity with and 
direct experience of the disaster they are being asked about. 
Given this, the aim is to interrogate people’s experience 
with disasters and use this and their responses to illuminate 
the probabilities they have ‘learnt’ from the environment. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 294 residents of Adelaide (152 female, 
133 male and 9 identifying as other) ranging from 13 (see 
below) to 63 (M = 25.8, SD  = 8.7).  
Initial recruitment was undertaken via fliers placed 
around the University of Adelaide, which indicated that only 
Adelaide residents over 18 could participate. A significant 
amount of snowball sampling occurred as participants 
forwarded the survey link to friends and family, however, 
leading to the inclusion of one respondent who was only 13.  
Of the participants, 12 had not completed high school and 
46 were high school graduates. The remainder included: 99 
who had attended but not yet graduated university; 87 with 
bachelor degrees; and 50 with higher degrees. Participants 
received a $20 gift voucher for completing the experiment. 
Materials 
An online survey was designed, which asked participants: 
for demographics; to select their response to a hypothetical 
disaster; and then describe their experience with disasters of 
that type. The survey questions are expanded on below. 
 
Demographics 
Participants provided their age, identified gender, level of 
education and length of residency in Adelaide. 
 
Disaster Questions 
The experiment used a 2x2x2 between-subjects design. 
(NB: the sample was limited by funding constraints to being 
slightly underpowered for a 2x2x2 design, it is sufficient for 
2x2 interactions.) The scenario described to participants that 
they had inherited a $400,000 house in the Adelaide Hills 
and, following this, scientists had revised the probability of 
a disaster (that would destroy the house) occurring in that 
area  up to 1% per annum for the next 10 year period. 
 
Familiarity. The first condition was familiarity with 
disaster type. Two disasters were included: earthquakes and 
bushfires as these reflect different experiences for Adelaide 
residents. Bushfires, while rare in an absolute sense (i.e., the 
probability of an individual being affected in any given year 
is very low) are familiar to Adelaide residents, with major 
events occurring at a rate of 6-7 per decade, historically 
(Luke & McArthur, 1978), and multiple, less severe fires 
occurring every year – with Country Fire Service (CFS) 
data recording ~12/year in the 2001-2015 period across 
Greater Adelaide’s peri-urban area (CFS, 2015).  
Earthquakes, by comparison, are unfamiliar, with only 30 
perceptible quakes since records began 132 years ago (i.e., 
~0.23 events per year) and none having caused damage 
since a M5.5 event in 1954. By these data, bushfires are ~50 
times as frequent in Adelaide as earthquakes. 
 
Format. The second condition was the format used to 
express the disaster probability – either a percentage (e.g., 
1%) or natural frequency (e.g., 1 in 100). Otherwise, 
probabilities were identical across conditions with a 1% p.a. 
chance of the disaster occurring across the next decade.  
 
Magnitude. The final condition was the magnitude change 
in probability and was either 10 or 100. That is, while the 
final (annual) probability of the disaster was 1%, this was 
described as having been increased from either 0.1% or 
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0.01% - or the natural frequency equivalents. 
 
Options. In all cases, participants selected from the same 
set of four responses. These were: 1) Do nothing; 2) Spend 
$10,000 on preparing the house to better cope with the 
named disaster and reduce the probability of it being 
destroyed by half; 3) Spend $20,000 on preparing the house 
to better cope with the named disaster and reduce the 
probability of it being destroyed by three-quarters; and 4) 
Sell the house at a $40,000 loss. 
These options thus reflect increasingly extreme immediate 
responses to the revised disaster probabilities and, in that 
sense, are ordinal. They also, however, form (approximate) 
pairs in expected value terms, with the EV of options 1 and 
4 both being approximately -$40,000 when considered 
across the 10 year period of increased risk – while options 2 
and 3 are both valued at approximately -$30,000. (These 
approximate values were used as it seemed unlikely that 
participants would use probability theory to calculate the 
precise values; i.e., that a 1% p.a. risk equates to a 9.56% 
chance of disaster across the decade). Given this, the choice 
data is more appropriately regarded as nominal. 
 
Experience Questions. 
In addition to the demographic and main experimental 
questions, five questions captured participants’ real world 
experience with the disasters they were asked about. The 
first two of these asked: how many such events the 
participant recalled having occurred in Adelaide; and how 
many of those recalled events caused significant damage. 
Three questions asked about the disaster’s salience to the 
participant. Specifically, whether: 1) the participant; 2) their 
friends/family; or 3) people in their local area, had suffered 
injury or property loss from such a disaster. 
Procedure 
Participants accessed the survey in their own time using the 
URL and an identifier code on tear-off tabs at the bottom of 
the fliers. After an initial page describing the basics of the 
experiment, participants were sorted into groups according 
to which of the 8 identifier codes they entered 
(corresponding to the possible condition combinations). 
They were then shown the disaster question for that 
condition and asked to select their response. After this they 
were asked the five follow-up questions and four 
demographic questions. Finally, they were asked to enter 
their email address (to arrange gift voucher pick-up). Most 
participants completed the task in less than 10 minutes. 
Results 
Initial analyses indicated that the magnitude manipulation 
was having no effect (main or interaction), therefore results 
are discussed without further mention of this. Table1 shows 
the percentage of participants selecting each of the four 
options – overall and, separately, divided by the familiarity 
and format conditions. 
Looking at Table 1, one sees three instances where the 
odds of a participant selecting a particular option seems to 
be affected by the manipulations with people about twice as 
likely to select to “Do nothing” rather than something in the 
low familiarity (Quake) and percentage formats conditions, 
Odds Ratio = 2.45 and 2.25, respectively. Participants in the 
frequency format conditions were, similarly, twice as likely 
to choose to sell the house as not, Odds Ratio= 1.98. 
 
Table 1. Percentages of participants selecting each option 










Overall  20.1 42.2 20.1 17.7 100 
Familiarity Quake 13.6 18.7 9.5 8.8 50.7 
 Fire 6.5 23.5 10.5 8.8 49.3 
Format Perc. 13.3 21.8 8.8 6.5 50.3 
 Freq. 6.8 20.4 11.2 11.2 49.7 
 
To assist in seeing interaction effects, Figure 1 shows the 
proportion of participants selecting each of the options, 
divided simultaneously by both familiarity and format. 
 
 
Figure 1: Participant responses by familiarity and format. 
 
As was seen in Table 1, both manipulations affect 
responses and Figure 1 suggests an interaction effect – with 
participants seeing the earthquake version of the task with 
percentage probabilities far more likely (41%) to do nothing 
than any other group (~13% across the three other groups).  
A 2x4 Chi-square test confirmed that familiarity was 
significantly associate with participant choice, χ2 = 9.2, p = 
.036. Analysis of residuals indicated the familiarity effect 
was driven by more participants selecting option 1 (do 
nothing) in the unfamiliar (Earthquake) condition relative to 
the familiar (Bushfire) condition. 
The effect of format was also significant, with people 
presented probabilities in natural frequency format tending 
towards more active responses. Specifically, the format 
change equated to a ‘upward’ shift of half a category on 
average. Again, a 2x4 Chi-square test indicated that format 
was significantly associated with participant choice, χ2 = 
10.8, p =.012. The residuals of this test told a similar story, 
with differences in the proportion of people choosing to do 
nothing in the percentage format being significantly higher 
than in the natural frequency format – although here there 
was also a significant difference for option 4 (sell house), 
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selected by more people in the frequency format. That is, 
the frequency format discouraged doing nothing and 
encouraged the most extreme response (sell house). 
 
Table 2. Log-linear analysis of 4x2x2 contingency table. 
 Interactions G2 df p 
1 Choice*Format*Familiarity 38.6 10 <.001 
2 Choice*Format 12.6 3 .006 
3 Choice*Familiarity 12.0 3 .007 
4 Format*Familiarity .06 1 .807 
5 Choice*Format (No Familiarity)  26.5 6 <.001 
6 Choice*Familiarity (No Format) 25.9 6 <.001 
7 Format* Familiarity (No Choice) 13.9 4 .008 
Note: rows 2-4 and 5-7 differ according to whether G2 is 
calculated after collapsing across the 3rd condition or after 
removing its effect. Note 2: G2 ≈ χ2. 
 
To assess the interaction effect, a 4x2x2 (choice x 
familiarity x format) log-linear analysis was conducted. 
Looking at its results in Table 2, one sees that most 
associations are significant – excepting between Format and 
Familiarity (row 4, which reflects the near-equal numbers in 
the conditions). Rows 2 and 3 correspond to the above 2x4 
tests and provide similar results. The key point from the 
table, however, is the highly significant 3-way interaction 
(row 1) – that is, format and familiarity interact with choice 
both individually and when considered together.   
Availability of Experience 
Recalled Events.  
Peoples’ recollection of disasters was tested simply by 
asking them to indicate how may such events they recalled 
from their residency in Adelaide and how many resulted in 
“widespread” damage. As no participants had resided in 
Adelaide long enough to recall the 1955 earthquake, no 
participants should have recalled earthquakes causing 
damage, making this comparison with the bushfire group 
redundant. Given this, Figures 2 and 3 show only the total 
number of disasters recalled plotted against the predicted 
numbers based on participant’s length of residency in 
Adelaide and the observed base rates of occurrence. 
Looking at Figures 2 and 3, one can see marked 
differences in the numbers of events recalled, with 7 being 
the highest value provided by a participant for number of 
earthquakes recalled whereas, in the bushfire condition, 
several values were close to 100 and the highest was 1000 
(requiring the log scale seen in Figure 2). 
A similarity between the two figures, however, is seen in 
the consistent under-recollection of disasters. That is, 
people recalled fewer bushfires and earthquakes than the 
base rates suggest they have experienced – and this effect 
was far stronger in the bushfire condition where the typical 
number recalled was less than 10 but the prediction was 
more than 200. Calculation of the proportion of recalled 
over experienced events across the two conditions shows a 
clear difference, with average proportion recalled being 0.54 
(median = 0.22) for earthquakes and 0.05 (median = 0.02) 
for bushfires. That is, the lower probability events 
(earthquakes), while recalled less often than the base rate 
predicts, are disproportionately better remembered than the 
more common bushfires – by a factor of 10. 
 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of predicted (residency x base rate) 
vs actual recalled number of bushfires. Red datapoints are 
outliers with (from left) 50, 80 and 1000 recalled fires. 
 
 
Figure 3: Scatterplot of predicted (residency x base rate) 
vs actual recalled number of earthquakes. 
 
Interestingly, the number of recalled events seems largely 
unrelated to the participants’ choices by in the experimental 
task – as shown in the mean rank data in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Mean rank of proportion of events recalled. 
Choice Earthquake Bushfire 
Do nothing 123.6 176.1 
$10K preparations 113.1 170.4 
$20K preaprations 134.6 169.5 
Sell House (-$40K) 125.6 170.9 
 
Analysis of differences between the groups in Table 2 
was undertaken via a 2x4 (familiarity x choice) ANOVA, 
run - due to the skewed data - on the ranked proportion of 
events recalled (as per Conover & Iman, 1981). This 
confirmed the difference in proportion of events recalled 
between the earthquake and bushfire familiarity groups, F(1, 
283) = 21.3, p <<.001 but indicated no significant difference 
between the proportion of events recalled by participants 
making different choices, F(3, 283) = 0.27, p = .848, and no 
interaction effect between choice and disaster type. 
 
Salience. 
The salience, to an individual, of the disaster type they were 
asked about was scored on a 0-3 scale according to how 
many of the three, salience questions they answered ‘yes’. 
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The data for bushfires and earthquakes are shown in Figures 
4 and 5, respectively. Comparing these figures, one sees, 
firstly, that salience differs markedly between the bushfire 
and earthquake groups – as expected, given our sample. 
Most (59%) of the bushfire group had non-zero salience, 
compared to only 14% of the earthquake group. 
Looking at the Figures together, though, one can see hints 
of the same pattern of results – increased salience seems to 
push people away from the two (financially) worse options 
(doing nothing or selling the house) and towards paying for 
preparations to reduce the risk to their house.  
 
 
Figure 4: Participant responses by salience (bushfire).  
 
 
Figure 5: Participant responses by salience (earthquake). 
 
Given only two people scored 3 on salience in either 
disaster condition, scores of 2 and 3 were grouped as ‘high’ 
salience for a 3x4 (salience x choice) chi-square test 
examining data from both disaster types simultaneously. 
This showed a significant association between salience and 
participants’ choices, χ2(6) = 22.1, p  = .002. Examination of 
residuals indicated this result was driven by an increased 
tendency for people with salience zero to elect to ‘do 
nothing’ and a decreased tendency for them to select ‘$20K 
preparations’, whereas people with salience 1 
disproportionately selected ‘$10K preparations’ and those 
with higher salience ‘$20K preparations’.  
Running the same analysis on just the bushfire data 
produced near-identical results but a 2x4 (salience x choice) 
chi-square test conducted on the earthquake data alone 
failed to reach significance – despite the similarity in 
patterns noted above, χ2(3) = 3.8, p = .300 – indicating that 
the overall effect is primarily driven by the bushfire data. 
Discussion 
These results provide a number of insights into difficulties 
facing people interested in the communication of disaster 
risk. Practical points relating to risk communication are 
discussed in the two following sections, prior to a discussion 
of theoretical implications in terms of Prospect Theory and 
the Description-Experience Gap. 
Familiarity and Format 
Two of our three manipulations showed clear effects: 
familiarity with disaster type; and the probability 
presentation format. The first is perhaps unsurprising, as one 
might expect that familiarity with a disaster might affect 
how one responds to it - and knowing how one should 
respond is likely to reduce the tendency (seen in our data) of 
people to do nothing when faced with an unfamiliar disaster.  
The second observation, that people respond more 
strongly when shown probabilities in a natural frequency 
format than percentages seems more surprising but accords 
with Gigerenzer and Hoffrage’s (1995) suggestion that 
people better understand this format. That is, it suggests that 
percentages may be an added level of abstraction that 
detracts from the immediacy of the risk communication. 
Availability: Recalled Disasters and Salience 
Interestingly, despite the clear effect of the disaster 
familiarity condition, the number/proportion of disasters 
recalled by participants had no bearing on their responses. 
That is, people who remembered more or fewer disasters 
relative to the ground truth did not differ from one another 
in terms of their responses to our questions. The clearest 
trend from this data was that, for both types of disaster, 
people tended to recall fewer than the base rate of 
occurrence suggested they had experienced. 
By contrast with recollection, salience clearly affected 
responses with people having had more direct experience of 
disasters inclined to take stronger precautions but also to 
avoid overreaction, as selling the house in our example 
would be classified (in expected value terms, at least). The 
implications of this for risk communication are awkward in 
that it suggests that messages need to be tailored according 
to whether a person has had salient experience of a disaster 
– as those without such may overreact or fail to act when 
presented with the same information to which a more 
experienced person will react appropriately. 
Theoretical Implications 
The recalled experience and salience data have implications 
for how best to approach risk communication. That people 
tended to underestimate the occurrence of disasters fits with 
the Description-Experience Gap understanding of learnt, 
low probabilities – tending to be lower than the true 
probability – rather than the Prospect Theory assumption 
that low probability events will be overweighted. 
However, the fact that the less common of the two 
disasters (earthquakes in the Adelaide context) shows 
higher rates of recall suggests that earthquakes are rare 
enough to be more memorable than bushfires – making 
them more available and thus causing their occurrence to be 
underestimated less than the more common bushfires. 
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This has implications for situations where smaller scale 
disasters occur relatively frequently – specifically, that 
people will tend to markedly underestimate the rate of 
occurrence of these, possible as a result of memory 
limitations – in both encoding numbers of similar, 
unremarkable events and then in retrieval when asked to 
recall a number of such events.  
Future Research 
The results suggest a number of directions. First is an 
attempt to more rigorously examine experience – that is, the 
roles of familiarity, recalled events and salience. How these 
relate to one another may shed further light on when and 
how to communicate risk. A first step would be to examine 
the different salience questions separately as it seems 
unlikely that these will be equally predictive (e.g.,  personal 
loss may have more impact than losses in the local region).  
A second step would be to conduct the reverse of the 
familiarity condition used herein – that is, test a sample in a 
location where earthquakes are more common and bushfires 
rarer to ensure that it is the manipulation and not differing 
characteristics of these disasters driving the results. 
Finally, future work should pay closer attention to the 
question of what is the right thing to do? Despite a brief 
discussion of expected value, the decision here was complex 
enough that no cut-and-dried correct answer existed. Given 
the goal of improved risk communication, it is important, 
however, to know if people are reacting appropriately – 
which requires a correct answer for comparison. 
Conclusions 
A person’s familiarity with a disaster - and its salience to 
them - impacts how they interpret and respond to events 
with the same risks. The unfamiliar earthquake risk in our 
experiment disproportionately produced inaction, while low 
salience did the same or pushed people to overreact. People 
with personal experience of disasters, by comparison, 
tended to prepare and try to mitigate their effects. 
Also of interest was the observation that presenting 
probabilities as natural frequencies resulted in people taking 
more active steps to mitigate or avoid the disaster. 
Finally, our results offer insights into how people learn 
the probabilities of disasters from the real world, the biases 
that tend to affect these and how these interact with biases 
known to affect described probabilities. 
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